Selasa, 05 Februari 2013
Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 4 (June 2007)
by Dan Flynn
Strategic Insights is a
bi-monthly electronic journal produced
by
the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California.
The views expressed here
are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Introduction
The following is the Executive Summary of Mapping the Global Future:
Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020
Project. The full report,
as
authored by the National Intelligence Council and presented at the conference by Dan Flynn, is available by clicking
here.
At no time since the formation of the Western alliance system in 1949 have the
shape
and
nature of international alignments been in such a state of flux.
The end of the Cold War shifted the tectonic plates, but
the repercussions from these momentous events are
still unfolding. Emerging powers in
Asia, retrenchment in
Eurasia, a
roiling Middle East, and transatlantic divisions are among
the issues that have
only come to a head in recent years. The very magnitude and speed of change
resulting from a globalizing world—apart from its precise character—will be
a defining feature of the world out to 2020.
Other significant characteristics include: the rise
of
new powers, new challenges to governance, and a more
pervasive sense
of
insecurity, including
terrorism. As we map
the future, the prospects for increasing global prosperity and the limited likelihood
of
great power conflict
provide an
overall favorable environment for coping
with what are
otherwise daunting challenges. The role of the United
States will be
an
important variable in how the world is shaped, influencing the
path that states and nonstate actors choose
to follow.
New Global Players
The likely emergence of China and India, as well
as
others, as new major global players— similar to the advent of a united
Germany in the 19th century and a powerful United States
in the
early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts
potentially as dramatic as those
in the previous two centuries. In the same
way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the “American Century,” the 21st century may be
seen
as
the time when Asia, led by China
and
India, comes into its own. A combination of sustained high
economic growth, expanding military capabilities, and large populations will be at
the root
of
the expected
rapid rise
in economic and political power for both countries.
Most forecasts indicate that by 2020
China’s gross national product (GNP) will exceed that of individual Western economic powers except for the United States. India’s GNP will have
overtaken or be
on
the threshold of overtaking European
economies.
Because of the sheer size of China’s and India’s populations—projected by the U.S. Census Bureau to be
1.4 billion
and almost 1.3 billion respectively by 2020—their
standard of living need
not approach Western levels for these countries to become important
economic powers.
Barring an
abrupt
reversal of the process of globalization or any major upheavals in these countries, the rise
of
these new powers is a virtual certainty. Yet
how
China and India exercise their growing
power and whether they relate cooperatively or competitively to other powers in
the international system are
key
uncertainties. The
economies of other developing
countries, such as
Brazil, could surpass all but
the largest European
countries by 2020; Indonesia’s economy could also
approach
the economies of individual European
countries by 2020.
By most measures—market size, single
currency, highly skilled work force, stable democratic governments, and
unified trade bloc—an
enlarged Europe
will be able to increase
its weight on the international scene. Europe’s strength could
be in
providing a model of global and regional
governance to the rising powers. But aging populations and
shrinking
work forces in most countries will have
an
important impact on
the continent. Either European countries adapt their work forces, reform their social welfare,
education, and tax systems, and
accommodate growing immigrant populations (chiefly from Muslim countries),
or
they face a
period
of protracted economic stasis.
Japan faces a similar aging crisis that could
crimp its longer run
economic recovery, but
it also
will be
challenged to evaluate its regional status and
role. Tokyo may have to choose between “balancing” against or “bandwagoning” with China. Meanwhile, the crisis over North Korea is
likely to come to a head
sometime over the next 15
years. Asians’ lingering resentments and
concerns over Korean unification and
cross-Taiwan Strait
tensions point to a complicated process
for achieving
regional equilibrium.
Russia has the potential to enhance its international role
with others due
to
its position as a major oil and gas exporter. However, Russia faces a severe demographic crisis resulting from low birth rates, poor medical care, and
a potentially explosive AIDS situation. To
the south, it borders an
unstable region in the Caucasus and
Central Asia, the effects of which—Muslim extremism, terrorism,
and endemic conflict—are likely to continue spilling over into Russia. While these social and
political factors limit the extent
to which Russia
can be
a major global player,
Moscow is likely to be
an
important
partner both for the established powers, the United States and Europe, and for the rising
powers of China
and India.
With these and
other new global actors, how we mentally map the world in 2020 will change
radically. The “arriviste” powers—China, India,
and perhaps others such
as
Brazil and Indonesia—have the potential to render obsolete the old
categories of East and West, North and
South, aligned and
nonaligned, developed and
developing. Traditional geographic groupings will increasingly lose
salience in international relations. A state-bound world and
a world of mega-
cities, linked by flows of telecommunications, trade and finance, will co-exist.
Competition for allegiances will be more
open, less fixed than in the past.
Impact of Globalization
We see globalization—growing interconnectedness reflected in the expanded flows of information, technology, capital,
goods, services, and people
throughout the world—as an overarching “mega-trend,” a force
so ubiquitous that it will substantially shape
all
the
other major trends in the world of 2020. But the future of globalization is not fixed; states and
nonstate actors—including
both private companies and NGOs—will struggle to shape its contours. Some aspects of globalization—such as the growing global interconnectedness stemming from
the information technology (IT) revolution—almost certainly will be irreversible.
Yet it
is
also possible, although unlikely, that
the process of globalization could be
slowed or even
stopped, just as the era of globalization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was reversed by
catastrophic war and
global depression.
Barring such a turn of events, the world economy
is
likely to continue growing
impressively: by
2020, it is projected
to be
about 80
percent larger than it was in
2000, and average per capita income will be roughly 50 percent higher. Of course, there will be
cyclical ups and
downs and periodic financial or other crises, but this basic growth trajectory has powerful momentum behind it.
Most countries around
the world, both developed and
developing,
will benefit from gains in the world economy. By having the fastest-growing consumer markets, more firms becoming world-class multinationals, and
greater S&T stature, Asia looks set to displace
Western countries as the focus for international economic dynamism—provided
Asia’s rapid economic growth continues.
Yet the benefits of globalization won’t be global. Rising powers will see
exploiting the opportunities afforded by the emerging
global marketplace as the best way to assert their great power status on
the world
stage. In contrast, some now in the “First World” may see the closing
gap with China,
India,
and others as evidence
of
a relative decline, even though the older powers are
likely to remain global leaders out to 2020.
The
United States, too,
will see
its relative power position eroded, though it will remain in 2020
the most important single country across all the dimensions of power. Those left behind
in
the developing
world
may resent China
and India’s rise, especially if they feel squeezed by their growing
dominance
in key sectors of the global
marketplace. And large
pockets of poverty will persist even in
“winner” countries.
The greatest benefits of globalization will accrue
to countries and groups that can access
and adopt new technologies. Indeed, a
nation’s level of technological achievement generally will be defined in terms of its investment in integrating and
applying the new, globally available technologies—whether the technologies are acquired through a
country’s own
basic research or
from technology leaders. The growing
two-way flow of high-tech brain
power between the
developing world and
the West, the increasing size of the information computer-literate work force in some developing countries, and efforts by global corporations to diversify their high-tech operations will foster the spread
of
new technologies. High-tech breakthroughs—such
as
in genetically modified organisms and increased food production—could provide a safety net eliminating the threat
of starvation and ameliorating basic quality of life issues for poor countries. But the gap between the “haves” and
“have-nots” will widen unless the “have-not” countries
pursue policies that support application of new technologies—such as good governance, universal education,
and
market reforms.
Those countries that pursue such policies could leapfrog stages of development,
skipping over
phases that other high-tech leaders such as the United States and
Europe
had to traverse in
order to advance. China and India are well positioned to become
technology leaders, and
even
the poorest countries will be
able to leverage prolific, cheap technologies to fuel— although
at a
slower rate—their own development.
The expected
next revolution in high technology involving
the convergence
of nano-, bio-, information and materials technology could further bolster China
and
India’s prospects. Both countries are
investing in
basic research in
these fields and
are well placed to be leaders in a number of key fields. Europe risks slipping behind
Asia
in
some of these technologies. The United States is still in
a position to retain its overall lead,
although it must increasingly compete with Asia
to
retain its edge and
may lose
significant
ground
in some
sectors.
More firms will become global, and those operating in
the
global arena will be
more diverse, both in
size and origin, more
Asian and less Western in orientation. Such corporations, encompassing the current,
large multinationals, will be increasingly outside the
control of any one state and will be key
agents of change in dispersing technology widely, further integrating
the
world economy, and promoting economic progress in the
developing world. Their ranks will include a growing number based
in such countries as China, India,
or Brazil. While North America,
Japan, and Europe might collectively continue to dominate international political and financial institutions, globalization will take on an
increasingly non-
Western character. By 2020, globalization could be
equated in the popular mind
with a
rising
Asia, replacing its current association with Americanization.
An expanding
global economy will increase demand for many raw materials, such as oil.
Total energy consumed probably will rise by about 50
percent in
the next two decades compared
to a
34 percent expansion from 1980-2000, with a greater share
provided by petroleum.
Most experts assess that with substantial investment
in new capacity, overall energy supplies will be sufficient to meet global demands. But on the supply side,
many of the areas—the Caspian
Sea,
Venezuela, and West
Africa—that are
being
counted on to provide increased output involve substantial political or economic risk. Traditional suppliers in the Middle East are also
increasingly unstable. Thus sharper demand-driven
competition for resources, perhaps accompanied
by a major disruption
of
oil supplies, is among the key
uncertainties.
China, India,
and other developing
countries’ growing
energy needs suggest a growing
preoccupation with energy, shaping
their foreign policies.
For Europe, an increasing
preference for natural gas may reinforce regional relationships—such as with Russia or North Africa—given the interdependence of pipeline
delivery.
New Challenges to Governance
The nation-state will continue to be
the
dominant unit of the global order, but economic globalization and the dispersion of technologies, especially information technologies, will place enormous new strains on governments. Growing connectivity will be accompanied
by the proliferation of
virtual communities of interest, complicating the ability of states to govern.
The
Internet in particular will spur the creation of even more global movements, which may emerge as
a robust force in international affairs.
Part of the pressure on
governance
will come from new forms of identity politics centered on religious convictions. In a rapidly globalizing
world experiencing population shifts, religious identities provide followers with a ready-made community that serves as a
“social safety net” in
times of need—particularly important to migrants. In particular,
political Islam will have a significant global
impact leading to 2020, rallying disparate ethnic and national groups and perhaps even creating an authority that transcends
national boundaries. A combination of factors—youth bulges in many Arab states, poor economic prospects, the influence of religious
education, and the Islamization of such institutions as trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, and political parties—will ensure that political Islam remains a major force.
Outside the Middle East,
political Islam will continue to appeal to Muslim migrants who are
attracted to the more prosperous West
for employment opportunities but do not
feel at home in
what they perceive
as
an alien and
hostile culture.
Regimes that were
able
to
manage the challenges of the 1990s could
be overwhelmed
by
those
of 2020. Contradictory forces will be
at work: authoritarian regimes will face new pressures to democratize, but fragile new democracies may lack the adaptive capacity to survive and
develop.
The so-called “third
wave” of democratization may be
partially reversed by
2020—
particularly among the states of the former Soviet Union and in Southeast Asia, some
of which never really embraced democracy. Yet
democratization and
greater pluralism could gain
ground
in key Middle Eastern countries which thus far have
been excluded from the process by
repressive regimes.
With migration on the increase
in several places around
the world—from North Africa and
the Middle East into Europe, Latin America
and
the Caribbean into the United States, and increasingly from Southeast Asia into the northern regions—more
countries will be multi-ethnic and
will face the challenge
of
integrating migrants into their societies while respecting their ethnic and
religious identities.
Chinese leaders will face a dilemma over how much
to
accommodate pluralistic pressures to relax political controls or risk a popular backlash if they do
not. Beijing may pursue an
“Asian way of democracy,” which
could involve elections at the local level and a consultative mechanism on
the national level, perhaps with the Communist Party retaining control over the central government.
With the international system itself undergoing profound flux, some of the
institutions that
are charged with managing global problems may be
overwhelmed
by them. Regionally based
institutions will be
particularly challenged to meet the complex transnational threats posed by terrorism, organized crime, and WMD proliferation. Such post-World War II
creations as the United Nations and the international financial institutions risk sliding into obsolescence
unless
they adjust to the profound changes taking place in the global system,
including the rise
of
new powers.
Pervasive Insecurity
We foresee a more pervasive
sense of insecurity—which may be as much based
on
psychological perceptions as physical threats—by 2020. Even as most of the world
gets richer,
globalization will profoundly shake
up
the status quo—generating enormous economic, cultural, and consequently political convulsions. With the gradual integration of China, India, and
other emerging
countries into the global economy, hundreds of millions of working-age
adults will become
available for employment
in what is evolving into a more integrated world labor market.
This enormous work force—a growing
portion of which will be well educated—will be
an attractive, competitive source
of
low-cost labor at the same time that technological
innovation is expanding
the range
of globally mobile
occupations.
The transition
will not be painless and will hit the middle classes of the developed world
in particular, bringing more rapid job turnover and
requiring
professional retooling. Outsourcing on
a large
scale would
strengthen the anti-globalization movement. Where
these pressures lead
will depend
on how political leaders respond, how flexible labor markets become, and
whether overall economic growth is sufficiently robust to absorb a growing
number of displaced workers.
Weak governments, lagging economies, religious extremism, and youth bulges will align
to create
a perfect storm for internal conflict in
certain regions. The number of internal conflicts is down significantly since the late 1980s and early 1990s when the breakup of the Soviet
Union and
Communist regimes in
Central Europe allowed
suppressed ethnic and nationalistic strife to flare. Although a leveling
off point
has
been reached where
we can
expect fewer such
conflicts than during the last decade,
the continued prevalence of troubled and institutionally weak states means that such conflicts will continue to occur.
Some internal conflicts, particularly those that
involve
ethnic groups straddling national boundaries, risk escalating into regional conflicts. At their most extreme,
internal conflicts can result in failing or failed states, with expanses of territory and populations devoid
of
effective governmental control. Such territories can
become sanctuaries for transnational terrorists (such as al-Qa’ida in
Afghanistan) or for criminals and
drug
cartels (such
as
in Colombia).
The likelihood of great power conflict escalating
into total war in the next 15 years is lower than at any time in the past century, unlike during
previous centuries when local
conflicts sparked world wars. The rigidities of alliance
systems before World War I
and during the interwar period, as well as the two-bloc standoff during the Cold War, virtually assured
that small
conflicts would
be quickly generalized. The growing
dependence on global financial and trade networks will help
deter interstate conflict but does not eliminate the possibility. Should conflict occur that involved
one or more of the great
powers, the consequences would be
significant. The absence of effective conflict
resolution mechanisms in some
regions, the rise of nationalism in
some states, and the raw emotions and tensions on both sides of some issues—for example,
the Taiwan
Strait or India/Pakistan issues—could lead to miscalculation.
Moreover, advances in
modern
weaponry—longer ranges, precision
delivery, and more destructive conventional
munitions—create circumstances encouraging
the preemptive use of
military force.
Current nuclear weapons states will continue to improve
the survivability of their deterrent forces and
almost certainly will improve the reliability, accuracy, and lethality of their delivery systems as
well as develop capabilities to penetrate missile
defenses. The
open demonstration of nuclear
capabilities by any state would further discredit the current nonproliferation regime, cause
a possible
shift in the balance
of power, and increase the risk of conflicts escalating into nuclear ones. Countries without nuclear weapons—especially in the Middle East and Northeast
Asia—might decide to seek them as it becomes clear that their neighbors and regional rivals are
doing so. Moreover, the assistance of proliferators will reduce the time required for additional countries to develop
nuclear weapons.
Transmuting International Terrorism
The key
factors that spawned international terrorism show no signs of abating
over the next 15 years. Facilitated by global communications, the revival of Muslim identity will create a framework for the spread of radical Islamic ideology inside and
outside the Middle East,
including Southeast Asia, Central Asia
and
Western Europe, where
religious identity has traditionally not been as strong. This revival has been
accompanied by a deepening
solidarity among
Muslims
caught up in national or regional separatist struggles, such as Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, Mindanao, and
southern Thailand, and has emerged in response to government
repression, corruption, and
ineffectiveness. Informal networks of charitable foundations, madrassas,
hawalas[1], and other mechanisms will continue to proliferate and
be exploited by radical
elements; alienation among
unemployed youths will swell the ranks of those vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.
We expect that by
2020 al-Qa’ida will be superseded by similarly inspired
Islamic extremist groups, and there is a
substantial risk that broad Islamic movements akin to al-Qa’ida
will merge with local separatist movements. Information technology, allowing for instant
connectivity, communication, and
learning, will enable the terrorist threat to become increasingly decentralized, evolving into an
eclectic array of groups, cells, and
individuals that
do not need
a stationary
headquarters to plan and
carry out
operations. Training materials, targeting guidance, weapons know-how, and
fund-raising will become virtual (i.e., online).
Terrorist attacks will continue to primarily employ conventional weapons, incorporating new twists and constantly adapting to counterterrorist efforts. Terrorists probably will be most original not
in
the technologies or weapons they use but rather in their operational concepts—i.e., the scope, design, or support arrangements for attacks.
Strong terrorist
interest in acquiring chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear weapons
increases the risk of a major terrorist attack involving WMD. Our greatest concern is that terrorists might acquire biological agents or, less likely, a nuclear device, either of which
could cause
mass casualties. Bioterrorism appears
particularly suited to the smaller, better- informed groups.
We also expect that terrorists will attempt cyber attacks to disrupt critical information networks and, even more likely, to cause physical damage
to
information systems.
Possible Futures
In this era
of great flux, we
see several ways in which major global changes could
take shape in
the next 15
years,
from seriously challenging the nation-state system to establishing a more
robust and
inclusive globalization. In the body of this paper we
develop these concepts in four fictional scenarios which were extrapolated from the key trends we discuss in this report. These scenarios are not meant as actual forecasts, but they describe
possible worlds upon
whose threshold we may be entering, depending on
how
trends interweave and play out:
Davos World provides an illustration of how robust economic growth, led by China and India, over the next 15 years could reshape the globalization process—giving it a more non-Western face and transforming the political playing field as well.
Pax Americana takes a look at how U.S. predominance may survive the radical changes to the global political landscape and serve to fashion a new and inclusive global order.
A New Caliphate provides an example of how a global movement fueled by radical religious identity politics could constitute a challenge to Western norms and values as the foundation of the global system.
Cycle of Fear provides an example of how concerns about proliferation might increase to the point that large-scale intrusive security measures are taken to prevent outbreaks of deadly attacks, possibly introducing an Orwellian world.
Of course, these scenarios illustrate just a few of the possible futures that may develop over the next
15 years, but the wide range
of possibilities we
can imagine suggests that this period will be
characterized
by
increased
flux,
particularly in contrast to the relative stasis of the Cold War era. The
scenarios are
not mutually exclusive: we may see
two or three of these scenarios unfold in some
combination or a
wide range
of other scenarios.
Policy Implications
The role of the United States will be an important
shaper of the international order in
2020.
Washington may be increasingly confronted with the challenge
of managing—at
an acceptable
cost to itself—relations with Europe, Asia, the Middle
East, and
others absent a
single
overarching threat
on which
to build consensus. Although
the challenges ahead will be
daunting, the
United
States will retain enormous advantages, playing
a pivotal role across
the broad range of issues—economic, technological, political, and military—that no other
state
will
match by 2020. Some trends we
probably can bank on
include dramatically altered
alliances and
relationships with Europe and
Asia, both of which formed the bedrock of U.S. power
in the post-World War II
period. The EU, rather than NATO, will increasingly become the primary
institution for Europe,
and the role
which Europeans shape for themselves on the world stage is
most likely to be projected through it. Dealing with the U.S.-Asia relationship may arguably be
more challenging for Washington because
of the greater flux resulting from the rise
of
two world-
class economic and
political giants yet
to be fully integrated into the international order. Where U.S.-Asia relations lead
will result as much or more from what the Asians work out among themselves as any action
by
Washington. One could envisage
a range of possibilities from the United States enhancing its role
as
balancer between contending forces to Washington being seen as increasingly irrelevant.
The U.S. economy will become more vulnerable
to fluctuations in the fortunes of others as global commercial networking deepens. U.S. dependence
on foreign oil supplies also makes it more vulnerable as the competition for secure
access grows and the risks of supply side
disruptions
increase.
While no single country
looks within striking distance of rivaling U.S.
military power by
2020, more countries will be in a position to make
the
United
States pay a heavy price for any military action
they oppose. The possession of chemical, biological, and/or nuclear
weapons by Iran and North Korea
and
the possible acquisition of such
weapons by others by
2020 also increase the potential cost of any
military action by
the
United
States against
them or their allies.
The success of the U.S.-led counterterrorism campaign will hinge
on the capabilities and
resolve
of
individual countries to fight terrorism on their own
soil.
Counterterrorism efforts in the years
ahead—against a more diverse
set of terrorists who are connected more by ideology than by
geography—will be a more
elusive challenge
than focusing on a centralized organization such
as al-Qa’ida. A counterterrorism strategy that approaches the problem on multiple fronts
offers the
greatest chance
of
containing—and ultimately reducing—the terrorist threat. The development of
more
open political systems and
representation, broader economic opportunities, and empowerment of Muslim reformers would be viewed
positively by the broad
Muslim communities who
do not support the radical agenda
of
Islamic extremists.
Even if the numbers of extremists dwindle, however, the terrorist threat
is
likely to remain. The rapid dispersion
of biological and
other lethal forms of technology increases the potential for an individual not affiliated with any terrorist group to be
able to wreak widespread
loss of life. Despite likely high-tech breakthroughs that will make it
easier to track and detect
terrorists at work, the attacker will have an easier job
than the defender because
the defender must prepare against a
large array of possibilities. The
United States probably will continue to be called on
to
help manage such conflicts as Palestine, North Korea, Taiwan, and
Kashmir to ensure they do not get out of hand if a peace
settlement cannot be reached. However,
the scenarios and trends we
analyze in
the paper suggest the possibility of harnessing
the power of the new players in
contributing to global security and relieving
the United States of some of the burden.
Over the next 15
years the increasing centrality of ethical issues, old
and new,
have the
potential to divide worldwide publics and challenge U.S.
leadership. These issues include the environment
and climate change, privacy, cloning and
biotechnology,
human
rights, international law regulating conflict, and
the role of
multilateral institutions. The
United States increasingly will have to battle world
public opinion, which has dramatically shifted since the end of the Cold War.
Some
of
the current anti-Americanism is likely to lessen
as
globalization takes on more of a non-Western face.
At the same time, the younger generation of
leaders—unlike during
the post-World War II period—has no
personal recollection of the United States as its “liberator” and is more likely to diverge with Washington’s thinking on
a range
of
issues.
In helping to map
out the global future, the United States will have many opportunities to extend
its advantages, particularly in shaping a new international order that
integrates disparate regions and
reconciles divergent interests.
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Notes
1. Hawalas constitute an informal banking
system.
adopted from : [ http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/35327/ichaptersection_singledocument/f322e893-3d82-4991-9051-31654d659e6b/en/flynnJun07.pdf]
