Selasa, 05 Februari 2013
Possible Futures
the next 15 years, from seriously challenging the nation-state system to establishing a more
robust and inclusive globalization. In the body of this paper we develop these concepts in four
fictional scenarios which were extrapolated from the key trends we discuss in this report. These
scenarios are not meant as actual forecasts, but they describe possible worlds upon whose
threshold we may be entering, depending on how trends interweave and play out:
• Davos World provides an illustration of how robust economic growth, led by China and
India, over the next 15 years could reshape the globalization process—giving it a more
non-Western face and transforming the political playing field as well.
• Pax Americana takes a look at how U.S. predominance may survive the radical changes
to the global political landscape and serve to fashion a new and inclusive global order.
• A New Caliphate provides an example of how a global movement fueled by radical
religious identity politics could constitute a challenge to Western norms and values as the
foundation of the global system.
• Cycle of Fear provides an example of how concerns about proliferation might increase to
the point that large-scale intrusive security measures are taken to prevent outbreaks of
deadly attacks, possibly introducing an Orwellian world.
Of course, these scenarios illustrate just a few of the possible futures that may develop over the
next 15 years, but the wide range of possibilities we can imagine suggests that this period will be
characterized by increased flux, particularly in contrast to the relative stasis of the Cold War era.
The scenarios are not mutually exclusive: we may see two or three of these scenarios unfold in
some combination or a wide range of other scenarios.
Policy Implications
The role of the United States will be an important shaper of the international order in 2020.
Washington may be increasingly confronted with the challenge of managing—at an acceptable
cost to itself—relations with Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and others absent a single
overarching threat on which to build consensus.
Although the challenges ahead will be
daunting, the United States will retain enormous advantages, playing a pivotal role across
the broad range of issues—economic, technological, political, and military—that no other
state will match by 2020. Some trends we probably can bank on include dramatically altered
alliances and relationships with Europe and Asia, both of which formed the bedrock of U.S. power
in the post-World War II period. The EU, rather than NATO, will increasingly become the primary
institution for Europe, and the role which Europeans shape for themselves on the world stage is
most likely to be projected through it. Dealing with the U.S.-Asia relationship may arguably be
more challenging for Washington because of the greater flux resulting from the rise of two worldclass
economic and political giants yet to be fully integrated into
the international order.
Where U.S.-Asia relations lead will result as much or more from what the Asians work out
among themselves as any action by Washington. One could envisage a range of possibilities
from the United States enhancing its role as balancer between contending forces to Washington being seen
as increasingly irrelevant.
The U.S. economy will become more vulnerable to fluctuations in the fortunes of others as global
commercial networking deepens. U.S. dependence on foreign oil supplies also makes it more
vulnerable as the competition for secure access grows and the risks of supply side disruptions
increase.
While no single country looks within striking distance of rivaling U.S. military power by
2020, more countries will be in a position to make the United States pay a heavy price for
any military action they oppose
. The possession of chemical, biological, and/or nuclear
weapons by Iran and North Korea and the possible acquisition of such weapons by others by
2020 also increase the potential cost of any military action by the United States against
them or their allies.
The success of the U.S.-led counterterrorism campaign will hinge on the capabilities and resolve
of individual countries to fight terrorism on their own soil. Counterterrorism efforts in the years
ahead—against a more diverse set of terrorists who are connected more by ideology than by
geography—will be a more elusive challenge than focusing on a centralized organization such as
al-Qa’ida.
A counterterrorism strategy that approaches the problem on multiple fronts
offers the greatest chance of containing—and ultimately reducing—the terrorist threat. The
development of more open political systems and representation, broader economic opportunities,
and empowerment of Muslim reformers would be viewed positively by the broad Muslim
communities who do not support the radical agenda of Islamic extremists.
Even if the numbers of extremists dwindle, however, the terrorist threat is likely to remain. The
rapid dispersion of biological and other lethal forms of technology increases the potential for an
individual not affiliated with any terrorist group to be able to wreak widespread loss of life. Despite
likely high-tech breakthroughs that will make it easier to track and detect terrorists at work, the
attacker will have an easier job than the defender because the defender must prepare against a
large array of possibilities. The United States probably will continue to be called on to help
manage such conflicts as Palestine, North Korea, Taiwan, and Kashmir to ensure they do not get
out of hand if a peace settlement cannot be reached. However, the scenarios and trends we
analyze in the paper suggest the possibility of harnessing the power of the new players in
contributing to global security and relieving the United States of some of the burden.
Over the next 15 years the increasing centrality of ethical issues, old and new, have the
potential to divide worldwide publics and challenge U.S. leadership.
These issues include the environment and climate change, privacy, cloning and biotechnology, human rights,
international law regulating conflict, and the role of multilateral institutions. The United States
increasingly will have to battle world public opinion, which has dramatically shifted since the end
of the Cold War. Some of the current anti-Americanism is likely to lessen as globalization takes
on more of a non-Western face. At the same time, the younger generation of leaders—unlike
during the post-World War II period—has no personal recollection of the United States as its
“liberator” and is more likely to diverge with Washington’s thinking on a range of issues.
In helping to map out the global future, the United States will have many opportunities to extend
its advantages, particularly in shaping a new international order that integrates disparate regions
and reconciles divergent interests.
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights
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Notes
1. Hawalas constitute an informal banking system.
adopted from : [mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/35327/ichaptersection_singledocument/f322e893-3d82-4991-9051-31654d659e6b/en/flynnJun07.pdf]
